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#/01)&23425673) ) ) ) ) ! #! Even if issuers were to comply fully with their current obligations to disclose climate change-related risks, a gap would remain between what issuers are required to disclose under securities law and what some investors would like to know about how issuers are responding to the challenges posed by climate change. This is because issuers are required to disclose only "material" risks. The ongoing uncertainty around future climate change-related legislation and the timing and extent of predicted physical impacts of climate change makes it difficult for issuers to determine whether these are reasonably likely to have a material effect on their financial results. Furthermore, if an issuer has determined that climate change will not have a material impact on its financial results, they are under no obligation to disclose their reasons for reaching this conclusion. Environmentally-responsible investors or institutional investors concerned with long-term, economy-wide risks of climate change 5 may want to know these reasons, however. It may be relevant to their investment decisions, for example, whether the reason is because the issuer has already taken positive actions to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions versus protecting the company's bottom line by purchasing carbon credits on the futures market which it can use to meet any future regulatory limits on carbon emissions, should they ever be imposed.
The materiality threshold for disclosure under securities regulation, therefore, may leave out information pertinent to some investors about a company's environmental performance. One solution is to require all companies to report on their environmental performance. This raises Disclosures", online: Chartered Accountants of Canada, <http://www.cica.ca/research-and-guidance/mda-andbusiness-reporting/mda-publications/item12846.pdf>.! 5 Some scholars have described large institutional investors as "universal" investors on the basis that their portfolios reflect the market as a whole and therefore they are more concerned (or ought to be) with issues that can affect the economy as a whole, such as climate change, than with individual company performance. See James P. what format and how frequently, and whether securities law is the most appropriate avenue through which to impose such a requirement. 6 In any event, legislation mandating environmental reporting beyond the materiality threshold is unlikely to come any time soon: provincial securities regulators are currently preoccupied with the fight over the constitutionality of the proposed national securities regulator and enhanced environmental disclosure. 7 Nor does the proposed national securities act make any mention of mandatory environmental disclosure. 8 In the meantime, it is relevant to ask whether voluntary disclosure in accordance with an international voluntary disclosure standard, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), might fulfill some of the objectives of mandatory disclosure and fill the gap in environmental information desired by some investors left by continuous disclosure obligations under securities law. I argue that the GRI's G3 Guidelines for voluntary reporting of environmental information does both and therefore concerned investors should turn their attention to encouraging companies to disclose in accordance with this standard. This article does not delve into the well-covered debate about the role of mandatory or voluntary disclosure as a tool of environmental regulation in changing corporation's behaviour towards the natural environment, nor the possible value of disclosure provided by the GRI and CDP to the public at large. Not to mention the responsibility of corporations for the environmental impacts of their operations and the compatibility of the current profit-maximization objective of the corporation with the concept of sustainable development. These issues are the focus of my SJD dissertation. 7 A reference to the Supreme Court of Canada on the constitutionality of the proposed federal act was heard by the Court on April 13, 2011; the decision is pending. 8 Proposed Canadian Securities Act, online: Department of Finance, <http://www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/csa-lvmeng.htm>. Arguably this is a matter to be dealt with through regulations made under the Act: see s. 227(v) of the proposed act. Part II summarizes the current Canadian disclosure requirements under which issuers might be required to disclose climate change-related information and discusses the materiality threshold for disclosure. This summary integrates the recent guidance from the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) on environmental disclosure. Part III reviews the main climatechange-related risks facing issuers, examines the difficulty in applying the materiality threshold to these risks and explains the "gap" in disclosure that would remain even if all issuers were accurately determining and disclosing their material climate change-related risks. Part IV first reviews some of the emerging international voluntary disclosure standards, including the GRI and the Carbon Disclosure Project. I then evaluate these standards in light of the advantages and disadvantages of mandatory and voluntary reporting.
II. CURRENT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
In Canada, there are two mandatory continuous disclosure documents in which issuers could be required to make climate change-related disclosure: the annual information form or "AIF"; and the management discussion and analysis or "MD&A", which must accompany all annual and interim financial statements.
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The required contents of the AIF are set out in Form 51-102F2. The AIF should contain "material information related to the issuer", rather than to the general state of the economy.
11
Item 5 is a description of the business. This description must include the "effects of environmental protection", specifically "[t]he financial and operational effects of environmental protection requirements on the capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position of [the] ] company in the current financial year and the expected effect in future years." 12 The recent guidance from the CSA explains that issuers should include information on the costs associated with compliance, "anticipated trends in respect of these costs, and the potential impact of these costs on the issuer's financial and operational results."
13
Issuers are also required to include a description of any social or environmental policies considered "fundamental" to the issuer's operations. 14 The recent CSA guidance on environmental disclosure instructs issuers to construe "policy" broadly to include policies on "sustainable development, community relations, the use and disposal of toxic or otherwise hazardous materials, prevention of spills, recycling, conservation of water and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions." 15 The description "may include a quantification of the costs associated with the policies!where quantitative information is reasonably available and would provide meaningful information to investors." 16 Finally, section 5.2 requires disclosure of "risk factors" and expressly mentions environmental risks.
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Disclosure of risks is also required in the MD&A. Form 51-102F1 instructs that MD&A should discuss "material information that may not be fully reflected in the financial statements"
and "important trends and risks that have affected the financial statements, and trends and risks The recent CSA guidance notes that "[t]here is no specified future time period that must be considered in assessing the impact of a known trend or uncertainty"; rather, the time period will depend on the particularities of both the issuer and trend or uncertainty in question.
21
All of these disclosure requirements are qualified, however, by the "materiality" Over the years, courts and securities commissions have attempted to interpret and give meaning to the "elusive" concept of materiality. 25 Of course, in the hands of the courts, the determination as to whether a given fact was "material" and therefore ought to have been In the YBM case, 28 the OSC noted that assessing materiality is "not a science" and "involves the exercise of judgement and common sense." 29 The Commission reiterated that the proper test for materiality "is one of market impact" from the perspective of the investor as an "economic being". 30 In other words, materiality is to be assessed from the point of view of an investor concerned with the "market price or value" of the security. 31 With respect to future events, the Commission cited the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson for the proposition that the potential effect on the market price had to be discounted by the chances of it occurring. 32 The Commission went on to find that even where probability cannot be determined with certainty, a fact may still meet the test for materiality "when the broader factual context suggests a risk faced by an issuer."
33
In Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., the Supreme Court of Canada held that the "business judgement rule" has no application to disclosure requirements. 34 The business judgement rule is applied by courts in reviewing decisions of the board of directors and states that courts will not interfere with decisions that fall within a "range of reasonableness". 35 In Kerr, the Court stated that "while forecasting is a matter of business judgement, disclosure is a matter of legal performance and disclosure are attracting increasing attention in the investment community, it is not clear that this concern is affecting where the majority of investors put their money. In other words, it is not clear that a company's overall environmental performance is currently influencing investors' decisions to buy, sell or hold a security. This recent attention, therefore, does not appear to represent a real shift in the definition of "reasonable investor" as an "economic being": environmental factors are taken into account only insofar as they might impact an issuer's bottom line. 40 And so long as investors are not basing investment decisions on environmental performance environmental factors are unlikely to have a "material" effect on issuers' financial results, except in extreme circumstances, such as the Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill. This is not to suggest that there are not very good reasons for investors to consider environmental factors in making investment decisions for reasons apart from their impact on expected returns, but rather that if there is a shift in investor behaviour, it may be less profound than some might hope. 41 For this reason, the materiality threshold still strictly limits the environmental information that an issuer is required to disclose under existing securities law. The next section explores in more detail the limit on disclosure imposed by the materiality threshold.
III. THE MATERIALITY OF CLIMATE CHANGE

A. Application of the Materiality Threshold to the Main Categories of Risk Posed by Climate Change
There is general agreement that the climate is warming as a result of human activity.
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The risks posed by climate change fall broadly into two main categories: physical risks and regulatory risks. 43 There is also a risk that governments or environmental groups will attempt to hold large emitters liable for the effects of climate change through litigation. 44 Although it is
See, e.g., CPPIB, Policy on Responsible Investing, supra note 38 at 1. 41 There is a small, but not insignificant market in North America for "ethical funds" that screen investments based on ethical criteria, including environmental factors. Canada's "social responsible investing" market was estimated at over 600 billion CAD The predicted effects of climate change include, among other things, the "availability of water"; the "productivity of farms, forests and fisheries"; and the "prevalence of oppressive heat and humidity" which, in turn, will impact costs related to "engineered environments" such as office buildings. 46 It is predicted that rising global temperatures will cause sea levels to rise, 47 which will "not only encroach directly on existing infrastructures but also accelerate the rates of coastal erosion, increase the damage due to storm surges, and contaminate coastal aquifers with salt water." 48 There is also evidence that climate change will cause, or is already causing, an increased number of both floods and droughts. 49 These physical impacts pose risks to businesses' assets, operations and markets. 50 The recent CSA guidance provides a list of specific examples of such risks, including property damage, disruptions to operations and increased insurance claims and premiums.
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Whether these predicted effects will occur, and, if so, when, is still uncertain. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is considered the authoritative voice on climate change. The IPCC has expressed "very high confidence" of increased risk of flood due to the rise in sea level, but only "medium confidence" that global warming will affect change in order to determine the materiality of these risks for the purpose of disclosure. Until these risks can be quantified with more certainty, any disclosure under existing requirements would have to be so vague and general, rather than firm-specific, as to be meaningless to investors.
Even if issuers could determine with any level of accuracy the reasonably likely effects of climate change on its financial results, the question remains whether a "reasonable investor"
would consider possible physical impacts 50-100 years in the future 55 "material" today? In its recent guidance, the CSA notes that the time horizon of a trend or uncertainty "may be relevant" to determining its materiality. 56 There are very good reasons for investors to take the possible impacts of climate change into account in making investment decisions, particularly for large institutional investors, such as public-sector pension funds with liabilities stretching generations into the future, 57 but it is not clear that these possible future impacts currently are affecting decisions to buy, sell or hold a particular security, having regard to the investor as an "economic With respect to regulatory risks, proposals to combat climate change are wide-ranging and include things that will save money in the long-term, such as improving the energy efficiency of buildings.
59
The biggest potential regulatory impact on issuers is the possibility of limits on GHG emissions and a corresponding increase in operating costs in order to comply. states and municipalities have enacted their own initiatives. 64 As a result of Congress' failure, the E.P.A. will impose limits on GHG emissions to take effect starting in mid-2011, 65 although the move is already being challenged in Congress and in the courts. 66 The only North American companies currently subject to GHG emissions limits are large emitters operating in Alberta 67 and companies operating in the European Union, which put in place a cap-and-trade regime to meet its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. 68 The one step forward, two steps back on climate change legislation in North America has made it difficult for issuers to determine whether climate change regulation "constitutes a 'known trend'" 69 that requires disclosure. The Conference Board of Canada has attributed the lack of disclosure on climate change at least partly to "a lack of clarity in federal regulations."
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With respect to the requirement to disclose the "financial and operational effects of environmental protection requirements" in the AIF, until regulation is imposed that puts a price on GHG emissions, any environmental costs of these emissions are "externalized" and do not have to be disclosed, 71 precisely because they have no impact on the issuers' financial results.
B. The Remaining Gap in Climate Change-Related Disclosure
Even assuming issuers are correctly assessing the materiality of the possible impacts of climate change to their future financial results, this may leave a gap in the information desired by some investors. Writing in the corporate governance context, Anand argues that requiring issuers ! *%! to disclose which voluntary corporate governance mechanisms they have adopted and to explain why they have not adopted others means that investors do not have to draw inferences as to the reason for an issuer's failure to incorporate a particular corporate governance mechanism. 72 The problem with climate change-related disclosure under current securities law requirements is that the materiality threshold forces investors to draw inferences as to why a particular issuer has failed to make any climate change-related disclosure and, unlike corporate governance, there is no handy list of climate change best practices in order to impose a similar "comply or explain"
rule. The materiality threshold in current mandatory disclosure rules means that if a company has determined that a risk is not "material" it is under no obligation to explain why it has come to this conclusion. 73 Is it because, for example, the issuer has already taken action to reduce its GHG emissions or because it does not anticipate becoming the target of climate change regulation or because it has stockpiled cheap carbon credits or because it simply has not considered the issue? 74 In sum, there is no obligation on an issuer that has failed to disclose any climate changerelated risks to make the statement "we do not consider climate change a material risk to our future financial results because we have already prepared for this risk in the following ways."
The materiality threshold may explain, therefore, the lack of climate change-related disclosure in many issuers' continuous disclosure documents, 75 but it does not necessarily follow that lowering or eliminating the materiality threshold with respect to information on issuer's environmental performance is the best way to fill this gap. 76 As Mahoney has noted, securities laws were "not designed to provide all value-relevant information to all market participants" 77 and "the more things a disclosure system attempts to do, the more substantial are the design problems facing its authors." 78 At some point, requiring disclosure of more information becomes counterproductive, 79 and, post-Sarbanes-Oxley, companies are already disclosing more information than ever. 80 The materiality threshold is an important guard against both information overload 81 and "obscuring material disclosures with unnecessary disclosures of immaterial information."
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At the same time, increased environmental reporting should be improved environmental reporting that avoids the pitfalls of existing mandatory disclosure documents. In its 2008 review of issuers' environmental reporting in continuous disclosure documents, the OSC noted that many of the issuers reviewed included only boilerplate discussion, even on company-specific matters, such as the issuer's environmental policies. 83 The next section of the paper examines whether voluntary disclosure mechanisms might fill, for now at least, the existing gap left by 81 Ibid. at 448. 82 CICA Brief, supra note 4 at p. 9. There is also a concern that too many "negativistic warnings" will lead them to be ignored or not taken seriously by investors: Kripke, supra note 25 at 15. Although the GRI's G3 Guidelines, discussed below, include the notion of materiality, the threshold "is not limited only to those sustainability topics that have a significant financial impact on the organization", but includes all impacts that could affect sustainability in the sense of meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs: see Global Reporting Initiative, "Defining Report Content: Materiality", online: GRI <http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G3Online/DefiningReportContent/>. 83 OSC, Environmental Reporting, supra note 3 at 2224 and 2226-27; CSA Staff Notice 51-333, supra note 4 at 4. mandatory disclosure under securities regulation and evaluates disclosure under GRI's G3
Guidelines against the arguments in favour of mandatory disclosure.
IV. FILLING THE GAP: THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
A. The Global Reporting Initiative and Other Voluntary Disclosure Regimes
In standards. 88 In 1999, GRI's "Sustainability Reporting Guidelines" for "triple bottom line" -economic, environmental and social -reporting were released. The Guidelines are now in their
Lydenberg, supra note 75 at 62-63. 85 Ceres, "Ceres Principles", online: Ceres, <http://www.ceres.org/about-us/our-history/ceres-principles>. 86 Lydenberg, supra note 75 at 63. 87 Ibid. The G3 Guidelines contain Reporting Principles, such as stakeholder inclusiveness, balance and accuracy, "for defining report content and ensuring the quality of reported information" and "Standard Disclosures", including numerous "Performance Indicators" for each of the three areas that make up the triple bottom line. 93 The Guidelines also take into account that a company's sustainability reporting will improve over time, and provide a ranking system for the level of compliance with the Guidelines to facilitate improvement.
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With respect to climate change specifically, the G3 Guidelines require reporting of energy consumed and energy saved through conservation efforts and efficiency improvements, and GHGs emitted and GHG emission reductions planned and achieved, as well as total Disclosure under the G3 Guidelines therefore helps to fill the gap left by the materiality threshold by allowing investors to see the company's vulnerability to climate change impacts, through the disclosure of energy consumed and GHGs emitted; how the company plans to address this vulnerability, through disclosure of initiatives to reduce GHG emissions; and the progress made so far, through disclosure of energy saved and GHG emission reductions achieved. In other words, voluntary disclosure using the G3 Guidelines can reveal the why behind an issuer's materiality determination, and permits to some extent an independent assessment of this determination by investors.
Although the G3 Guidelines appear to be the "emerging standard" for reporting nonfinancial information, 97 they are just one set of voluntary disclosure standards a company could choose to follow. Specifically related to the issue of climate change is the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). The guiding principle behind the CDP is that "a business can only manage what it measures." 98 To this end, the CDP, acting on behalf of 534 institutional investors, 99 sends out an annual information request form to 4,700 large corporations around the world. 100 The form asks
95 GRI, "Making the Connection", supra note 88 at 10-11. 96 Ibid. at 10. for data on direct and indirect GHG emissions, as well as information on physical and regulatory risks and opportunities. 101 In 2010, 3050 companies responded to the request. 102 CDP then compiles and analyzes the responses and provides the data and analysis to investors in the form of various reports. CDP also publishes a "Carbon Leadership Index" of the companies in each sector that provided the most comprehensive responses to the information request. 103 Also specific to climate change is the Global Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure, released by a group of institutional investors, including CalPERS, in October 2006. 104 The
Framework consists of four elements of disclosure: total historical, current and projected GHG emissions; the company's climate risk and emissions strategy; assessment of physical risks; and analysis of regulatory risks. These elements are to be applied through both current mandatory disclosure requirements and voluntary regimes such as GRI, thereby complementing existing disclosure requirements under securities law and other voluntary standards.
The next two sections compare the advantages of mandatory versus voluntary environmental disclosure to determine whether voluntary disclosure might fill the gap left by disclosure made in accordance with the existing requirements under securities law. Given GRI's position as the emerging standard, the analysis focuses primarily on GRI's G3 Guidelines. I argue that disclosure in accordance with the GRI's G3 Guidelines achieves many of the goals of mandatory disclosure, such as comparability across companies and provides useful, credible information to investors.
B. The Advantages of Mandatory Disclosure
The primary advantage of mandatory disclosure is, not surprisingly, its mandatory nature:
all issuers must disclose. Since voluntary disclosure standards "cannot compel adherence...there will be holdout problems." 105 Market pressure to voluntarily disclose will be insufficient "if a firm's competitors choose not to disclose similar information." 106 Therefore, if a firm's competitors are not disclosing their GHG emissions or climate change action plan, there is little incentive for a firm to be the first to do so. 107 After all, why would corporate officials voluntarily take the risk of negative investor or consumer reaction to the disclosure? This may help to explain why participants in voluntary disclosure schemes tend to be firms that already have high environmental performance standards. 108 Take up of the GRI has in fact been limited. In 2010, the GRI was aware of 1,397 companies who had issued sustainability reports using the G3 Guidelines. 109 In 2008, the companies reporting in accordance with the G3 Guidelines included one third of S&P 100 companies and 77% of the world's 250 largest companies, 110 but these numbers represent a very small percentage of all corporations worldwide and, in 2006, only 292 companies were reporting ! ""! in full compliance with the guidelines. 111 The Board of the GRI itself has called on governments to make environmental, social and governance (ESG) reporting mandatory. 112 Making disclosure mandatory, however, does not necessarily mean that it will be complied with. 113 France has experienced very low compliance rates with its mandatory social and environmental reporting requirements. 114 As noted above, investors and regulators have expressed concern that North American issuers are not complying fully with existing environmental disclosure requirements. 115 Companies may be more likely to comply with voluntary approaches when they are involved in developing the disclosure standards, since they are then more likely to view them as reasonable. 116 As discussed further below, GRI develops its guidelines through extensive consultation with stakeholders.
117
There are also countervailing forces to the disinclination to disclose, although there is likely a limit to what these forces can achieve absent mandatory disclosure rules. 118 If investors continue to demand more and better climate change-related disclosure, issuers may choose to respond to that demand without the need for mandatory disclosure rules. 119 Although leaving it up to issuers to judge the demand for climate change-related disclosure may slow take-up of voluntary disclosure standards like the G3 Guidelines, it also allows issuers to determine whether additional non-material disclosure is worth the expense or whether these resources would be better spent implementing other environmental initiatives. 125 effect on investor and company behaviour to justify directing resources to disclosure over other possible forms of environmental regulation.
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Another important touted advantage of mandatory disclosure rules is that they ensure "that information will be conveyed to investors in a standardized manner", 127 thereby facilitating comparison of companies 128 and enhancing credibility. 129 The correlative criticism of voluntary disclosure in general and sustainability reports in particular is that they do not provide the standardized, credible disclosure on climate change necessary for investors to make meaningful comparisons.
130
The G3 Guidelines seek to address the problems of standardization and comparability by providing a standard format and set of indicators for companies to use in disclosing environmental performance information to investors. An investor is therefore able to compare companies adhering to the G3 Guidelines, since they will be providing the same information in the same format. The specificity of the information requested under the G3 Guidelines also facilitates comparison.
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A related criticism of voluntary disclosure is that it fails to provide clear "benchmarks" by which to measure an issuer's performance against both other issuers and that issuer's own performance in previous years. 132 The G3 Guidelines, however, provide benchmarks in the form of reporting of total emissions of GHGs, ozone-depleting substances, NO X , SO 2 and "other
As noted in the Introduction, the merits of disclosure as a form of environmental regulation, but see references supra note 9. 127 132 Schatz, supra note 44 at 357; Karkkainen, supra note 9 at 261, 291; Case, supra note 9 at 396. significant air emissions" by weight. 133 The G3 Guidelines also provide a standard for disclosure against which to measure non-G3 Guidelines environmental reporting.
The credibility problem is particularly relevant to company "sustainability reports", which are often viewed as mere "public relations" exercises that tend to focus on opportunities, rather than risks. 134 This perception is reinforced when sustainability reports are issued in response to negative publicity about a company's environmental performance. 135 It would seem, however, that having gone to the expense of producing a sustainability report, an issuer would want to signal its credibility to investors. Although mandatory disclosure rules backed by penalties for misrepresentation are one way of providing credibility, adherence to a set of voluntary disclosure standards, like the G3 Guidelines, can also serve this function. 136 First, full compliance with the standard demonstrates that the company is not making selective "selfserving" disclosures. 137 Second, specific aspects of voluntary disclosure standards can assist in ensuring credibility. The G3 Guidelines' "Management Approach" items enhance credibility through disclosure of "credibility-boosting" indicators, such as the monitoring and follow-up measures implemented to support any lofty goals. 138 Although the CDP does not verify the accuracy of responses, the information request form includes questions regarding "sources of uncertainty" in the data provided, such as assumptions or extrapolations made in calculating the quantity of GHG emissions. 139 Third, the information provided through the G3 Guidelines' specific input and output "indicators" on, for example, the amount of a company's GHG than reporting requirements based on broad concepts of corporate social responsibility. 140 Credibility also can be enhanced through auditing, or by including environmental reporting with financial reporting in the annual report. 141 The credibility concern can also counter the disincentive to disclose negative information, 142 since disclosing bad news may help to ensure that the good news is not discounted as being incomplete. 143 Finally, mandatory disclosure also provides an answer to the "free-rider" problem that arises from the "public good" component of disclosure. This problem has two aspects: the impossibility of issuers recouping the cost of developing a disclosure format from other issuers who will be able to use it 144 and the difficulty of analysts in recouping the full value of time spent gathering information. 145 Non-profit organizations, such as GRI and the CDP, can provide a solution to this problem, however: they are not concerned, as private companies or analysts would be, about going to the expense of developing a disclosure format only to have other companies "free-ride" and simply copy it 146 or not being able to recover the full cost of gathering information from the investors who will make use of it. Growing investor interest in this information should ensure that these organizations continue to have funding to engage in standards development and information gathering.
B. The Advantages of the Voluntary Disclosure under the G3 Guidelines
Apart from the low take-up rates of the GRI's G3 Guidelines among issuers, the Guidelines would seem to achieve several of the advantages of mandatory disclosure, including standardization, comparability and credibility. Use of voluntary disclosure standards such as the G3 Guidelines also has its own advantages, including allowing greater room for innovation, collaboration and flexibility, and providing "green" companies with an effective way to distinguish themselves from "dirty" ones.
The "proliferation of single issue disclosure initiatives", 147 such as the CDP, may impede the move towards standardization, but it also helps to ensure that voluntary disclosure standards continue to evolve and improve. 148 Ongoing refinement of the G3 Guidelines ensures that disclosure in accordance with this standard continues to reflect the information investors actually want. 149 The goal is to maintain the right balance between innovation and standardization. 150 This is an advantage that voluntary disclosure has over mandatory disclosure, since writing disclosure rules into law effectively stops the innovation process. 151 There also is a significant amount of consultation among the different climate change disclosure initiatives. For example, the CDP and Ceres both sit on the World Economic Forum's Climate Disclosure Standards Board, another organization working towards the development of a standard framework for climate change-related disclosure. 152 Continuing innovation also allows for ongoing consultation with various stakeholders in order to come to a true consensus on the appropriate level and The other advantage of a voluntary approach to climate change disclosure is that even as it moves towards standardization, it maintains flexibility. 155 The GRI/Global Compact guidance document notes that there is no "single way to prepare a sustainability report", but "encourages" companies to use the GRI G3 Guidelines. 156 Climate change-related disclosure, in particular, is not amenable to a "one size fits all" approach. Climate change will impact different companies very differently, as will regulation of GHG emissions. A mandatory disclosure rule could result in the disclosure of irrelevant, or vague, boilerplate, information by many issuers. 157 Flexibility also allows smaller companies to tailor their disclosure as needed. 158 Current mandatory disclosure requirements under securities law are frequently criticized for placing too heavy a burden on smaller companies, effectively precluding them from the public markets. 159 This is one reason why North American regulators might want to wait and observe companies' experience using the G3 Guidelines for small and medium-sized companies.
Another advantage of single-issue voluntary disclosure schemes is that they are tailored to a specific area in which some investors might be particularly interested. Voluntary disclosure on a specific issue, such as climate change, allows interested investors to save time by accessing efficiently the information that matters to them, rather than having to spend time searching through mandatory continuous disclosure documents. 160 Investors may find "comprehensive reports" "daunting" or "boring". 161 Disclosure focused on a single issue, such as that made in response to the CDP information request, hopefully avoids the "information overload" problem for investors and experts alike. 162 Finally, voluntary disclosure allows "good" or "green" companies to distinguish themselves from "bad" or "dirty" ones. By choosing to disclose environmental information in accordance with a voluntary standard such as GRI, a company can signal its commitment to environmental issues. This is similar to the way a company can signal its value by listing its shares on a publicly-traded stock exchange, thereby "voluntarily" agreeing to be bound by mandatory disclosure rules in securities legislation. 163 In order for signalling to be effective, however, it has to be difficult for bad companies to mimic. 164 The G3 Guidelines ranking system Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 105 at 709. As outlined in section II above, information related to climate change could be disclosed in various sections of the AIF or the MD&A. 161 Lydenberg, supra note 75 at 77. 162 Paredes, supra note 79 at 455-56. 163 Ibid. at 471. 164 Ibid. 165 See supra note 103.
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climate change-related risks under current mandatory securities disclosure rules, the materiality threshold means that a gap would remain between what issuers are mandated to disclose and the level of detailed information desired by some investors. Voluntary disclosure initiatives such as
The Global Reporting Initiative's G3 Guidelines are helping to fill this gap by providing more comprehensive, specific and detailed climate-change related disclosure in a standardized manner.
I do not wish to paint an overly rosy picture of voluntary disclosure -take-up of the G3
Guidelines remains low, for example -but the existence of an emerging global standard for voluntary climate change-related disclosure helps to achieve the comparability and credibility of mandatory disclosure and encouragement from institutional investors and other organizations could help to boost use of the G3 Guidelines and other voluntary disclosure standards. The GRI's G3 Guidelines also provide an example of an environmental disclosure standard, one regulators would do well to study more carefully before expanding existing disclosure requirements in order to ensure that the information disclosed by issuers is in fact useful to investors and not more unhelpful, boilerplate statements.
